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ST. LaUIS LAW" EV iW
STATE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONI.
mSTORIOAL DEVLOPMENT.
When I came to prepare this paper, I had difficulty in
beginning. The audience all being members of the legal pro-
fession, expects to have the subject treated from a legal view-
point. The subject, however, is primarily not a legal but ani
economic one. Public service commissions deal more with
facts than with legal principles. Yet while the problems we
have to solve are usually problems of fact, nevertheless these
problems are controlled and governed by rules of law. The
interesting things of any work are not the bare facts, or the
bare principles that control the combination of facts, but are
the problems to be solved. I shall discuss one or two of the
legal problems involved in regulation that have heretofore
been at least practically solved, and the principles of law
which were developed and applied in the solution. At the
same time I will try to interweave an historical sketch of the
work, as well as some economic principles and practical situa-
tions necessary to elucidate the legal side of the discussion,
The field of administrative law has been materially en-
larged in recent years. A few years ago the legislative branch
of government enacted laws concerning many subjects which
are now dealt with by an administrative body to which the
legislature has delegated regulatory powers formerly exer-
cised by it. Not long ago, in a search for authorities on a
legal point pertaining to the functions of public service com-
missions, I discovered that Cyc. contained no separate article
on the subject of public utility regulation. Reference was
1. Address delivered before the St. Louis Bar Association, April 9, 1923, by
Hon. John A. Kurtz, Chairman of the Missouri Public Service Commission. (Mr.
Kurtz died suddenly in June, 1923.)
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made by it to such general subjects as that of Constitutional
Law. I predict that when Corpus Juris is finally completed,
it will have a separate article on this subject. Many new
principles of law pertaining to the control and regulation of
public utilities by commissions, are now in the formative state.
The development of a new body of law, however, is a
leisurely process. Many of the fundamental principles of
regulation and control of public service companies were estab-
lished by the old common law. In one of the leading cases,
Munn v. Illinois,2 Chief Justice Waite quotes from Lord Chief
Justice Hale's De Portibus Maris as follows:
"A man, for his own private advantage, may, in a port
or town, set up a wharf or crane, and may take what rates he
and his customers can agree for cranage, wharfage, housel-
lage, pesage; for he doth no more than is lawful for any man
to do, viz.: makes the most of his own ..... If the king or
subject have a public wharf, unto which all persons that come
to that port must come and unlade or lade their goods as for
the purpose, because they are the wharfs only licensed by the
queen ..... or because there is no other wharf in that port,
as it may fall out where a port is newly erected; in that case
there cannot be taken arbitrary and excessive duties for cran-
age, wharfage, pesage, etc., neither can they be enhanced to
an immoderate rate; but the duties must be reasonable and
moderate, though settled by the king's license or charter. For
now the wharf and crane and other conveniences are affected
with a public interest, and they cease to be juris privati only;
as if a man set out a street in new building on his own land,
it is now no longer bare private interest, but is affected by a
public interest."
Again, in the same case, pages 129-130, it is stated that
commpn carriers were subjected to regulation as early as the
2. 94 U. S. 113.
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reign of William and Mary, and in support thereof the opinion
quotes the preamble of a statute,3 to-wit:
"And whereas divers wagoners and other carriers, by
combination amongst themselves, have raised the prices of
carriage of goods in many places to excessive rates, to the
great injury of the trade," etc.
If a careful search were made of the files of the Missouri
Public Service Commission, I believe resolutions couched in
practically the language as the foregoing could be found.
Anyway, I have a recollection of having heard the same idea
expressed. However, the quotations show that centuries ago
some of the fundamental principles of the law were developed
around which we are now extending a body of new principles.
Since the reign of William and Mary there have been
tremendous developments in the public utility industry. The
age of invention at that time had not yet arrived. The modern
industrial machine was then beyond the imagination. The
complex organizations and great aggregations of capital
known as the modern public service corporations have devel-
oped during the last fifty years, with the emphasis on the last
half of that period. What the advance will be in the near
future none can foretell.
Any radical change in the activities of society necessarily
is followed by the development of new rules and principles of
law to fit the changed conditions. A new invention or the
discovery of a hitherto unknown force creates new material
for the legislative mill, new problems for judicial analysis and
solution. Every period of material advancement is accompa-
nied by changes in law and government. So long as the
public service was rendered by an individual or by a simple
business organization and was accomplished by a means read-
ily understood by the layman, so long the governmental
3. 3 W. & M., p. 12, Sec. 24.
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machinery necessary to regulate that service could remain
simple in its nature. The regulation of the hackney coach,
the wharf, the warehouse, the turnpike, the bridge and the
ferry could be satisfactorily accomplished by the legislative
body, whether state or municipal, then existing; but when the
stagecoach and hackney coach were superseded by the steam
railroad and the street railway, aggregating billions of in-
vested capital and millions of employees, and accomplishing
the transportation of millions of tons of freight and likewise
millions of people; when the candle was superseded by the
electric plant, furnishing light not only to an entire city
but, by means of transmission lines, to many towns and cities
widely separated; when the post messenger was superseded by
the telephone and telegraph, as they in turn are possibly to be
superseded by the radio and aeroplane, then there was cre-
ated a condition that is not simple either in organization,
means or effects, but is so complex, so large, so tremendous
and so interlaced with the entire social fabric, that its com-
prehension is beyond the man of the street and is beyond
intelligent regulation by a legislative body. To intelligently
regulate the modern utility requires the employment of tech-
nical men and experts who are familiar with the machines
used in manufacturing or supplying the product and who are
able to ferret out the true facts by investigation.
The regulation of public utilities being a legislative func-
tion, was adequately accomplished by legislative bodies so long
as the service was furnished by simple organizations. Orig-
inally Congress and state legislatures enacted statutes per-
taining to railroads, while city boards of aldermen enacted
ordinances prescribing the rates and practices of local utili-
ties. The first commissions created were railroad comms.
sions. New Hampshire and Rhode Island created railroad
commissions as early as the year 1844, Vermont in 1855, Maine
in 1858, Ohio in 1867 and Massachusetts in 1869. All, how-
ever, had very limited jurisdiction. Their powers were largely
inquisitorial to gather information for the use of the legisla-
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tive body in enacting regulatory statutes. They had none of
the broad powers now lodged in public service commissions.
After the Civil War railroad development made great
strides. The problems became more complex. A demand
arose for not only the regulation of the practices, but also of
the rates of these companies. Legislatures began to pass
statutes fixing maximum fares. Congress created the Inter-
state Commerce Commission to regulate interstate carriers.
However, on account of the unwieldy nature of legislative
'bodies, the technical inexperience of their members, the short
term of their sessions and the political features that invari-
ably were forced into their deiberations, it was found that the
subject needed a more scientific treatment. The more ad-
vanced thought of the land began to advocate the idea that
the legislative arm of the government should do its regulating
through a special body created for that purpose. This idea
gained such force that the last decade of the 19th century
was characterized by extending the jurisdiction of the existing
railroad commissions to include the power to regulate rates.
Not until the 20th century, however, was the jurisdiction of
State commissions extended to the regulation of local public
utilities. This idea was ushered in by the recreation in 1907
of the Wisconsin Commission giving it jurisdiction over rail-
roads, telephones and telegraphs, water and electric com-
panies. New York and other States followed soon thereafter,
until at the present time practically every State in the Union
has a public service commission, with full power to regulate
not only the practices, but also the rates and security issues
of both State wide and local utilities. Nine States of the Union
have established their commissions by constitutional provision,
and thereby placed these quasi-judicial bodies beyond the pale
of the legislative power to destroy.
We are prone to forget the reasons for this change. It
was. apparent to those who carried on the affairs of the State
at the time, that the practices and rates of these recently
developed and powerful corporations could not be fairly and
218
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intelligently regulated by technically inexperienced bodies like
legislatures or city boards of aldermen; that on principle at
least it appeared necessary to create a body which would
become expert in its knowledge of the subject and which
would be in continuous session to act at any time that it
appeared from investigation to be necessary to protect the
rights of the public. These bodies were given wide powers
and were authorized to employ the necessary engineers, ac-
countants, rate experts and other technical men to make in-
vestigations and ferret out the true facts. To these commis-
sions, by statute or constitutional provision as the case may
be, has been delegated the legislative power to regulate.
In 1913 the general assembly created the Missouri Com-
mission. Prior to that time the regulatory power of the State
was exercised by numerous authorities. The Railroad and
Warehouse Commission had limited jurisdiction over rail-
roads. The legislature itself at every session had under con-
sideration railroad rate and other regulatory statutes and
several rate statutes were enacted. In addition to the juris-
diction exercised by the legislature and the Railroad and
Warehouse Commission, municipalities regulated the use of
local facilities of railroads and the speed of trains within the
confines of the municipality. The regulation of local utilities,
such as water, gas, telephone and electric plants, was lodged
in the local municipal authorities, subject, of course, to the
exercise of any power which the legislature might see fit. The
general assembly in 1907 passed an act delegating to cities
and towns the power to regulate the rates of their local utili-
ties and authorizing such cities and towns to create utility
commissions. In 1909 the general assembly created local
commissions for the larger cities and such commissions were
in existence at the time of the creation of the Public Service
Commission in 1913. These city commissions, however, could
not and did not build up strong investigating forces. Most of
the cities were unable to give the financial support that was
necessary to continuously keep in their employ accountants,
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valuation engineers, rate experts and other technical men.
In some instances, of course, efficient commissions could be
maintained. The city of St. Louis had the means of giving the
proper financial support. In general, however, these local
commissions employed technical men only when a particular
investigation was to be made and paid the regular professional
fees for such services. Not only was this course expensive,
but the experts so employed were quite often without previous
experience in this particular field of their profession. Any-
way many of these cities advocated and assisted in the enact-
ment of the Public Service Commission law in 1913.
In a general way the foregoing covers the historical de-
velopment of the regulation of the public utilities.
ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE OF THE MISSOURI CoMMISSION.
On account of the unfamiliarity of the average lawyer
with the work of the Public Service Commission, an outline
of the organization and procedure of the Commission might
te of interest to many of you. The Missouri Commission con-
sists of five members, one of whom has been with the Com-
mission since its organization, first as General Counsel and
later as Commissioner. Another has been with the Commis-
sion six years, while the other three have been members there-
of for about two years each. The Commissioner from this
city, Mr. A. J. O'Reilly, is an engineer by profession.
The organization of the technical forces of the Commis-
sion is as follows: Valuation department, cbnsisting of a
chief engineer and six assistants; Accounting department,
consisting of a chief accountant and six assistants; Railway
and Transportation department, under the management of a
railway transportation and rate expert; Telephone depart.
ment, under the management of a telephone expert; Water,
Gas and Electrical department, under the management of an
electrical and mechanical engineer. In addition to the above
departments, we have a legal department of two attorneys
and a court reporting department with two reporters, and the
Washington University Open Scholarship
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vfficial publisher of the Commission's decisions, together
with a secretary and clerical forme.
The chief engineer, chief accountant and the chief of the
Railway department have all been with the Commission since
its creation. The length of service of the other technical men
varies from six years to one year. In the employment of these
technical men political affiliations have been disregarded.
While I am Chairman of the Commission, yet I do not know
the politics of some of these men. The Commission itself is
a nonpartisan body, not by law but by custom. It now con-
sists of three Republicans and two Democrats. While the
majority of the Commission at the present time is Republican,
yet we have in our employ men with such names as Murphy,
iloulihan and Lysaght. These men are technical men in a
special field of their profession. An ordinary certified ac-
countant or a civil engineer does not become proficient in
utility regulation until he has had at least one year's ex-
perience in the work. Until he becomes familiar with the laws
and decisions on utility regulation he must act as an assistant
to more experienced men. It is, therefore, essential for the
good of the service that the State retain its efficient technical
men until at least they can command larger salaries than the
State will pay. During the last two years we have had several
resignations because salaries were offered which the Commis-
sion for lack of funds could not meet.
In a rate case there are two principal things to be de-
termined by the Commission. First, what is the fair value of
the property used and useful in the public service? Second,
what are the reasonable operating expenses incurred in ren-
dering that service? When the fair value of the investment
is found and the reasonable cost of operation is determined,
you have the basis of calculating the revenue that must be
raised and, having the amount of the product that can be
sold, the rate may thus be built.
The valuation department of the Commission makes pre-
liminary investigations for the Commission to determine the
221
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true fadrs concerniing value. The engineers by actual count
and inspection determine just what property is owned by
the utility and the condition thereof. They likewise deter-
mine as one element of value the cost the company incurred
in erecting and installing the plant as and when constructed.
In making up the valuations the engineers pay no attention
to excessive bond issues or watered stocks. These are no
criterion of value and the public is not required to pay there-
on. The true facts concerning actual value are sought. The
Commission is furnished the detail of every unit of property,
namely: the quantity, size, age and condition of poles, wires,
buildings, machinery, tracks, cars, etc., with the cost incurred
by the company in installing same. The six assistants of the
chief engineer are divided into two teams of three men each
to do this field investigation. The Commission tries to keep
one of these teams in the country towns while the other is
usually employed in the larger cities.
In determining the operating revenues and expenses of
the company the Accounting department audits the books and
records of the company. They examine the detailed entries
and verify each entry of expense by requiring a receipted
voucher therefor. The organization of the Accounting de-
partment is on the same principle as that of the Valuation
department. There are two teams of three men each. Many
complicated questions arise in the accounting work which re-
quire experience, ability, energy, initiative and trustworthiness
on the part of these men. They must see that capital expendi-
tures are not charged to operating expense; that expendi-
tures in making replacement of worn-out units are not charged
to operations but to depreciation reserve and to capital ac-
count. The Commission requires the company to set up a de
preciation reserve account for the purpose of replacing worn-
out units. The original cost of the worn-out units must be
charged to this reserve and cannot be allowed to swell ex-
pense of operations, while the excess in cost of the new unit
222
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over the cost of the worn-out unit is charged to capital
additions.
Again, many companies operate several utilities in the
same town or city. In St. Joseph the street railway, the elec-
tric light and power and the heating plants are all operated
by the same company. In some towns the utility operates
private businesses in connection -with the utility, such as
creameries, ice plants, etc. The operating expense of each of
these utilities must be kept separate and the overheads pro-
rated to the different departments. The accountants must see
that the expense in operating the private business is not
charged to the expense of operating the public business which
is paid for by the rates fixed by the Commission. There are
hundreds of complicated questions which arise. The Commis-
sion's accountants ferret these out as impartial investigators
with the idea of getting before the Commission the true facts,
neither colored in favor of the public or the utility. The color-
ing, if any, is left to the representatives of the city and of the
utility. You can readily see that this kind of work must be
carried on by trustworthy, experienced men, and that politics
should have no part therein. It is important that the work
of the Commission and its employees be as impartial and
non-political as that of the courts.
When the Valuation and Accounting departments have
completed their field investigations, they then compile a de-
tailed written report of their findings, which is filed with the
Commission and copies mailed to the city and the utility.
Thereafter a public hearing is held, at which time the Com-
mission's accountants and engineers formally present their
reports and findings in evidence and testify concerning the
same. The city and the utility are thereby given an oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the Commission's experts and to pre-
sent such evidence as they deem necessary. After the hearings
are completed the Commission has the case before it from
three viewpoints: that of the utility, that of the city and the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol8/iss4/2
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consumer, and that of impartial and experienced investigators
in the employ of the Commission. It would seem, on principle
at least, that the Commission would now have before it such
evidence that it could make a finding fair and just both to
the utility and to the public, not necessarily satisfactory to
either party, but, nevertheless, fair. I desire to interpolate
here that this method has generally been found by the courts
to have resulted in such finding by the commissions that
courts of last resort in many of the States have held that the
findings of the commissions on questions of fact are prima
facie reasonable and valid, and that a clear case must be made
by an appellant to overthrow the prima facie case.
No decision of the Missouri Commission in reference to
a rate has ever been overthrown by a decision of the Supreme
Court of this State on the ground that the rate fixed was
unfair to the public. On the other hand, several findings of
the Commission in reference to rates have been set aside by
the courts on the ground that the rates fixed resulted in the
confiscation of the property of the utility. I do not state this
fact for the purpose of reflecting credit upon the Public
Service Commission, as I believe that the decisions of the
Commission should be impartial. However, the Commission
in making up its findings should decide the clearly doubtful
questions against the party having the burden of proof upon
the point. This means, of course, that since the burden of
proof in a rate case is usually upon the utility to show the
reasonableness of the rate, the clearly doubtful questions
should be decided in favor of the public. This principle has no
doubt led to a reversal in favor of the utilities of some of the
Commission's decisions, since what is doubtful is a relative
matter. Questions that may seem doubtful to the Commission
on appeal may not seem doubtful to a court.
In the early decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court
the principle of presumption of right action on the part of the
Commission was not adopted. In Railroad v. Public Service
224
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Commission,4 Lusk v. Atkinson,5 and State ex rel. v. Public
Service Commission ;6 various opinions were expressed by the
individual judges, the court, however, refusing to adopt the
prima facie doctrine. But in the recent decision of State
ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. Public Serv-
ice Commission, 7 Chief Justice Walker, who wrote the major-
ity opinion, uses this language:
"The statutes declaring rates fixed by the Commission
to be prima facie reasonable until that presumption is removed
by one seeking their annulment are but a proper recognition
of the power and purpose of the Commission, without which
its acts would be mere empty declarations, whose effective
operation would, in each instance, have to await judicial ap-
proval. Such a conception of the nature and powers of the
Commission is wholly unauthorized. Organized, as the statute
creating the Commission clearly declares, for the purpose of
supervising and regulating public service corporations, the
courts, in reviewing its actions, proceed upon the assumption
that the experience of the members of the Commission has
especially fitted them for dealing with questions concerning
the powers and activities of such corporations; and, despite
the fact that the entire evidence will be reviewed, much con-
sideration is to be given to the findings of the Commission,
which, if reasonable, and neither arbitrary nor capricious,
will be deferred to. N. Y. & Q. Gas Co. v. McCall.'
Judge James T. Blair wrote a separate concurring opin-
ion in which he expressed his opinion as follows, to-wit:
"The previous opinions of this court upon this question,
in some of which the writer concurred, do not contain any
4. 266 Mo., I. c. 341.
5. 268 Mo., 1. c. 118.
6. 271 Mo., 1. c. 168.
7. 233 S. W. 425, 430.
8. 245 U. S., 1. c. 347; 38 Sup. Ct. 122; 62 L. Ed. 337.
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evidence of a real examination of the issue. Those decisions
are opposed to practically all decisions in the country on the
point, are obviously incorrect, and should be overruled with-
out further delay. If the majority opinion is to be understood
as reaffirming them, which matter its language leaves rather
in doubt, I do not agree to that reaffirmance. If that opinion
is to be understood as adopting the rule of the cases cited
from other jurisdictions in support of the rule it states, then
its language should be changed to adopt that rule in plain
terms, and expressly overrule our former decisions upon this
question."
THE POLICE POWER.
The right of the State to regulate the rates and practices
of a public utility is referable to the police power of the State.
The utility business is monopolistic in its nature. This is true
for the reason that the investment necessary to furnish the
service is so great in proportion to the annual income, that to
offer the consumer a selection between the service of two
companies would be too costly and would necessarily result
in excessive rates. Unlike the merchant, the utility cannot
make its product at a central plant where its customers may
come to purchase, or from which the product is delivered by
trucks remaining in service throughout the entire day. To
deliver the product the utility is compelled to have a perma-
nent investment in mains, lines or tracks extending to the door
of the customer. These mains, lines and tracks remain there
tventy-four hours a day, though the customer uses them only
a fractional part of the time.
To put it in another way. Roughly speaking, the annual
gross revenue of a utility is about one-fourth to one-half of
the investment, so that it requires a period of two or four
years for a company to make its "turnover." For instance,
the gross sales of the Laclede Gas Light Company of St. Louis
226
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for the year 1922 were $6,863,930.00, while the investment of
the company assumed by the Commission in fixing the rates
was $27,585,500.00. On the basis of the value assumed by the
Commission the annual revenue of this company is about one-
fourth of the investment, so it would receive a "turnover" in
about four years. On the other hand, the merchant or other
private business concern may, and often does, make a "turn-
over" of the investment once, twice and occasionally three
times in one year. This is not invariably true but, in a
general way, it illustrates the idea that I am endeavoring to
convey. [he investment per unit of revenue from sales is st
much larger than is usually true in other businesses that it is
uneconomic to have full competition in the business of furnish-
ing gas, water, electric lights and power or street railway
,service. In the past there have been quite often several gas,
water or electric systems within some of our larger cities.
However, they have not been in complete competition with
each other, but only to the extent of bidding against each other
for extensions into new territory.
Two street railway lines have not been laid in the same
street or adjacent streets, nor have two water or gas mains
I)een found in the same streets so as to serve the same cus-
tomers. To a very limited extent they may be, but generally
they cannot be because of the disparity be tween the invest-
ment and the annual gross revenue from sales. Therefore,
on account of the nature of the business and the heavy fixed
investment, the utility is, in its nature, monopolistic.
The rule is less applicable probably to a telephone system
than to any other, yet the principle applies to it in a more
or less degree.
A business which is a monopoly is released to a large
extent from the restraints of economic laws. The law of
supply and demand does not control its prices for it itself
controls the supply. The restraint of competition being ab-
sent, the principle of what the traffic will bear tends to pre-
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vail. What is true of the rates and charges is likewise true
regarding its usages and practices. Where the necessity of
getting the business is absent, the selfish element in human
nature is not restrained.
On the other hand, the product or service furnished is a
necessity. The customer, except to a limited extent, can not
forego the service. By reason of the fact that the business
is a monopoly and the service a necessity, there is an incen-
tive for the utility to resort to unfair practices and exorbitant
charges if not restrained or regulated by the State. So the
courts have held that the property of a utility though private
in ownership is devoted to a public use and is affected with a
public interest. To protect the rights of the citizen, the State,
through the exercise of the police power, steps in and regulates
the utility in its charges and practices.
As heretofore stated, one of the leading cases elucidating
the principle of the constitutional right of the State to regu-
late property devoted to a public use is the case of Munn v.
Illinois, supra, with which you are all familiar.
It will be remembered that the general assembly of the
State of Illinois enacted a statute, approved April 25, 1871,
fixing maximum charges for the storage of grain in ware-
houses located in Chicago. This statute was attacked on the
ground, among others, that it was in contravention of rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. Chief Justice Waite delivered the
opinion of the court. He set forth the theory that the body
politic is a social compact whereby each citizen has contracted
with very other citizen, and with the whole body of citizens,
that each shall be governed by rules and laws for the common
good. This social compact theory as being the true theory
of the State has since that time been denied by some authori-
ties on political science. Be that as it may, the Chief Justice
after setting forth the theory, continued on page 125 as
follows:
228
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"From this source come the police powers, which, as was
said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney in the License Cases, 5 How.
683, 'are nothing more or less than the powers of government
inherent in every sovereignty ..... that is to say ..... the
power to govern men and things.' Under these powers the
government regulates the conduct of its citizens one towards
another, and the manner in which each shall use his own
property, when such regulation becomes necessary for the
public good. In their exercise it has been customary in Eng-
land from time immemorial, and in this country from its first
colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen,
bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, etc., and in so doing
to fix a maximum of charge to be made for services rendered,
accommodations furnished, and articles sold."
After setting forth the facts showing that these ware-
houses were virtual monopolies, the opinion on page 132 con-
tinues:
"They stand, to use again the language of their counsel,
in the very 'gateway of commerce,' and take toll from all
who pass. Their business most certainly 'tends to a common
charge, and is become a thing of public interest and use.'
Every bushel of grain for its passage 'pays a toll, which is
a common charge,' and, therefore, according to Lord Hale,
every such warehouseman 'ought to be under public regula-
tion, viz., that he ..... take but reasonable toll.' Certainly
if any business can be clothed 'with a public interest, and cease
to be juris privati only,' this has been."
The court finally concluded that the statute was a proper
use of the police power by the State and, therefore, was not in
contravention of constitutional rights. Since that decision
the legal principles therein elucidated have been extended
enlarged, and, in some respects, changed.
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The exercise of the police power is primarily a legislative
function; the legislature and not the judicial arm of the gov-
ernment prescribes rules and regulations circumscribing fu-
ture action. Some of the earlier decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States seem to hold that the exercise of
this power by a legislative body was unlimited and could be
exercised at the whim of the legislature, and that the courts
had no control over the legislative branch of government
therein. In the Munn case, Justice Waite, in discussing the
existence of this power, said:
"We know that this is a power which may be abused;
but that is no argument against its existence. For protection
against abuses by the legislatures the people must resort to
the polls, not to the courts."
Again, the same Justice, in the case of Pick v. Chicago
and Northwestern Railroad,9 used this language:
"Where property has been clothed with a public interest,
the legislature may fix a limit to that which shall in law be
reasonable for its use. This limit binds the courts as well
as the people. If it has been improperly fixed, the legislature,
not the courts, must be appealed to for the change."
The courts, however, soon abandoned the idea that the
legislative power to regulate was unlimited, and adopted the
principle which now prevails, namely, that the power to regu-
late is not a power to destroy; that the State under the guise
of regulation cannot deprive a citizen of property without
just compensation or without due process of law. While you
as lawyers are all familiar with the present rule that the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
9. 94 U. S. 178
Washington University Open Scholarship
'STATE PTBLIO SHITICE UOMMISSIOIT
States protects the property of citizens from confiscation by
an act of the legislature or by a commission to which the
legislative regulatory power has been delegated, yet this rule
did not spring forth full grown in the first instance in which
it was asserted. The development of the rule was a process
arrived at through the trial and argument of several cases.
The general assembly had this inhibition upon the exer-
cise of the police power in mind when it enacted the Public
Service Commission law. The provisions of the statute giving
power to the Commission to fix rates provides: "The Com-
mission shall with due regard, among other things, to a reason-
able average return upon the value of the property actually
used in the public service and of the necessity of maling
reservation out of income for surplus and contingencies, de-
termine the just and reasonable rate," etc.
FRANCHISE RATES.
Turning now from general principles to a consideration
of a particular subject, a brief outline of the Commission's
duty regarding franchise rates may be of interest. I have
found that a large per cent. of the members of the Bar are
unfamiliar with the principles of law involved. Many, in fact,
most lawyers who have not had occasion to give professional
attention to the subject, view the matter in about the same
light as does the layman, namely, that a contract is a contract.
They view it from their knowledge of the law governing agree-
ments between individuals, and not from the viewpoint that
the fixing of rates by franchise was a means or manner of
regulation. They fail to remember that the regulation of rates
is the exercise of the police power which cannot be alienated
or contracted away by the State or by such an agency of the
State as a municipality; they fail to remember that the Con-
stitution and laws of the States are part and parcel of the
terms of the franchise.
It is interesting to note how, when and why the principle
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was first enunciated that the States by reason of the police
power had the right to change franchise rates. It is interest-
ing to note that it was established at the behest and insistence
of the representatives of the public and originally was as
vigorously opposed by the corporations as it is now espoused
by them. The rule was established in cases arising prior to
the high price era and prosecuted upon the insistence of the
consumers that the particular contract rate in controversy
was exorbitant and should be reduced in protection of the
inalienable rights and general welfare of the citizens. (See,
Milwaukee Electric Railway and Electric Light Company v.
The Railroad Commission of Wisconsin.)" ° This case was
not the first one in which the question arose, but it is one of
the leading cases often cited and was commenced prior to the
abnormal price level and upheld a reduction in franchi'e
fares. The fact that the courts had decided that franchise
rates were not necessarily binding upon the State, and that
when found exorbitant the same might be reduced through the
exercise of the police power, is one of the reasons why the
creation of ublic service commissions in the respective States
was a popular movement, resulting in the establishment of
these commissions in practically every State in the Union,
and is likewise one of the reasons why the utilities originally
opposed the creation of such commissions. It was realized
by the molders of public opinion that a commission equipped
with engineers, accountants and experts to ferret out and
build up the facts to show that a rate was really exorbitano
was necessary if any reduction made was on appeal to with-
stand the scrutiny of the courts. The enigma in the matter
was, that the advocates who -established this doctrine did not
foresee the high prices that might and did come in the future;
but when the era of high prices came the principles thus estab-
lished were resorted to by the utilities to have franchise rates
10. 153 Wis. 592-affirmed in 238 U. S. 174.
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increased. No doubt the irony of the situation as illustrated
by the foregoing has been one of the outstanding causes- for
the recent opposition to public service commissions, not only
in Missouri, but in all of the other States of the Union. HOw-
ever, time is a great healer. Many franchises or so-called
contract rates have been entered into during the high price
period, and our Commission has already reduced some of these
franchise rates; and time, with reductions in the costs of oper-
ation, will bring more, together with a more favorable public
attitude to the child of its creation.
But I started out to discuss the principles of law involved
in cases where franchise rates have been set aside. I will
deal with the subject as it has been ruled upon under our
Constitution and laws. The same principles, with variations
due to different constitutional and statutory provisions, have
been followed in other jurisdictions.
Section 5, Article 12 of the Constitution of this State,
adopted in 1875, provides that "the exercise of the police
power of the State shall never be abridged," etc. In many
of the other States, there exist constitutional or statutory
provisions similar in effect to our Constitutional provision
concerning the abridgment of the police power. It is inter-
esting to note the reason advanced by some writers for this
solicitude concerning abridgment of the police power. The
reasons given by one writer are two: one, the Federal Con-
stitutional inhibition that "No State shall ... pass any ...
law impairing the obligation of contracts;" the other, the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Dartmouth
College case, decided in 1819. (See editorial notes, advance
sheets P. U. R. Vol. 1922C No. 4.) In the Dartmouth College
case the court held that the State, by granting a charter to a
corporation, had entered into a contract, and that a statute
subsequently enacted which undertook to recall some of the
powers lawfully granted constituted an impairment of the
contract within the meaning of the Constitution. Thereafter
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the States in granting charters to corporations have been
solicitous to reserve the right to subsequently change the
charters or to enact laws in furtherance of the general wel-
fare as the exigencies may from time to time demand without
being restrained by the constitutional inhibition covering the
impairment of contracts.
It would seem that the well established rule that the police
power is an attribute of sovereignty which cannot be alienated
or abridged would make such solicitude on the part of the
State unnecessary, and such seems to have been the attitude
prior to the Dartmouth College case. But on analysis it will
be seen that the line of demarcation of what is and is not
within the police power is not clearly defined. In fact, the
courts have held that the field within which the power may be
exercised is so broad and, to keep pace with the advance of
civilization, so changeable, that it is impracticable as well as
impossible to make an all inclusive or all exclusive definition
of the power. Thus, while it is held that the regulation of
utility rates is an exeercise of the police power which cannot
be bartered away, yet it has also been held that a city ordi-
nance fixing rates for a limited period of time binds the parties
thereto if the city making it has been legally authorized by the
legislature to contract concerning rates; and that such a con-
tract for a limited period is not an alienation of the police
power. (See opinion of Chief Justice White in Southern Iowa
Electric Company v. Chariton.)11
Whether or not the editor of the P. U. R. notes has given
the true reason for the solicitude of the States in reference to
the police power, nevertheless State constitutions and statutes
do quite often expressly provide that the exercise of the police
power to control corporations shall not be abridged or con-
tracted away.
What is known as the "Sedalia" case,12 is probably thp
11. P. U. R. 1921 D, L c. 277 and cases cited.
12. 275 Mo. 201.
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one from this jurisdiction most often cited in support of the
doctrine that the State cannot contract away its regulatory
power over rates. The controversy in this case arose as fol-
lows: A complaint was filed by citizens of Sedalia against
the water company of that city alleging inadequate service.
After hearing and investigation the Commission ordered the
company to build reservoirs and certain other improvements.
which cost the company about $100,000. After making the
improvements as ordered, the company applied for an increase
in its rates, including those for fire hydrant rental which had
been fixed by a franchise ordinance and accepted by the com-
pany. After investigation of the value of the property and
the operating expenses of the company in rendering the serv-
ice, the Commission granted an increase in rates, including
the fire hydrant rental. The city brought the case to the
Supreme Court for review on the ground that the Commission
had no power to change the fire hydrant rental fixed by the
ordinance as it constituted a binding contract between the
city and the utility. The court found that no serious conten-
tion could be made that the rates fixed by the Commission
were unreasonable and that, therefore, the only question
involved was the jurisdiction of the Commission to set aside
the contract rate. Judge Graves wrote the opinion, in which
all concurred. It is so concise and states the law so clearly,
that I shall take the liberty of quoting it at length.
After stating that the Public Service Commission Act is
to be liberally construed, the opinion on page 206 continues
as follows:
"Not only so, but we have traced the Public Service
Commission Act to the police power of the State. In the Gas
Company case, supra, 254 Mo. 1. c. 534, in speaking of this law
we said: 'that act is an elaborate law, bottomed on the police
power. It evidences a public policy hammered out on the
anvil of public discussion. It apparently recognizes certain
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generally accepted economic principles and conditions, to-wit,
that a public utility (like gas, water, car service, etc.) is in
its nature a monopoly; that competition is inadequate to pro-
tect the public, and, if it exists, is likely to become an economic
waste; that State regulation takes the place of and stands
for competition; that such regulation, to command respect
from patron or utility owner, must be in the name of the over-
lord, the State, and to be effective must possess the power of
intelligent visitation and the plenary supervision of every
business feature to be finally (however invisibly) reflected in
rates and quality of service. It recognizes that every expen-
diture, every dereliction, every share of stock or bond or
note issued as security is finally reflected in rates and quality
of service to the public, as does the moisture which arises in
the atmosphere finally descend in rain upon the just and un-
just willy nilly.'"
"We have further recognized that the Legislature can
delegate to the Public Service Commission the power to ascer-
tain and fix reasonable rates for services rendered to the
public by the divers public service corporations. (State v.
Public Service Commission, 194 S. W. 1. c. 291.) In this case
Faris, J., has aptly said:
" 'It is also settled beyond doubt or cavil that this power
of prescribing maximum rates for common carriers, which,
as we have seen, legislatures possess pursuant to an untram-
meled grant of the power to pass laws, may be delegated to a
railroad commission or to a public service commission. To
this rule, unless inhibited by express constitutional provision,
there is not a reputable exception.'
"Other Missouri cases might be cited, but these suffice
for the thought now in mind. First, it is made clear by these
cases that the ascertaining and establishing of reasonable
rates for public service is one falling within the police power
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of the State. Let us stick a peg here, because this becomes
important later. Second, it is likewise made clear that the
fixing of reasonable rates may be delegated by the Legislature
to the Public Service Commission, subject, of course, to a
court review upon the question of reasonableness.
"With these two questions made clear and conclusive by
our own rulings we will take up later the real question of the
instant case. In its discussion there should be kept constantly
in mind the two questions, supra: (1) That the fixing of rea-
sonable rates for public service is traceable to the police power
of the State, and (2) that within proper bounds and limita-
tions the fixing of such reasonable rates can be committed to
a body, such as our Public Service Commission.
"H. It is claimed by relator that under the last proviso
of Section 9239, Revised Statutes 1909, the city was authorized
to contract for water service to the city without having such
contract submitted to a vote of the people. This we think is
true. Such is the statutory provision. The question really
is to what extent such contract is affected by a subsequent
law by and through which the Legislature asserts the sov-
ereign power of the State relative to regulating rates for
public service.
"In reality the question is deeper than suggested above.
Going to our Constitution, the real question is, can the Legis-
lature authorize a municipal corporation or a public service
corporation to make a contract as to rates which contract
will preclude the sovereign power of the State from fixing
reasonable rates irrespective of the contract? We use both
the terms 'municipal corporation' and 'public service cor-
poration' purposely, because they are usually the opposing
parties to the contract. In the instant case the municipal
corporation is the party to the contract upon one side, and a
public service corporation is the party upon the other side.
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The two corporations are the two parties which stood at
arms-length in the making of the contract here involved. So
that we are forced to answer the question, 'Can the State of
Missouri divest itself of the right to exercise its police power?'
This court has held, and we think rightfully so, that the fixing
of reasonable rates for service to be rendered to the generaI
public (which general public includes municipal corporations,
as well as the citizens thereof) is an exercise of the sovereign
police power of the State. Section 5, Article 12, of the Mis-
souri Constitution reads: 'The exercise of the police power
of the State shall never be abridged, or so construed as to per-
mit corporations to conduct their business in such manner as
to infringe the equal rights of individuals, or the general well-
being of the State.'
"Note the language, 'the exercise of the police power of
the State shall never be abridged.' Under such a constitu-
tional restriction the Legislature would be powerless to enact
a valid law by the terms of which the right of the State in
the exercise of its sovereign police power in the fixing of
reasonable rates for public services could be limited or
abridged. This court so held in Tranbarger v. Railroad, 250
Mo. 1. c. 55.
"Some of us thought the pronouncement a little broad
and dissented, but the case was taken to the United States Su-
preme Court and there affirmed. (Chicago & Alton Railroad
Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67.)
"The United States Supreme Court was even more ex-
plicit in this Tranbarger case than was the majority opinion
in this court. To its rule we must bow. At page 76 of 238
U. S., in this Tranbarger case, it is said:
" 'It is established by repeated decisions of this court
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1hat neither of these provisions of the Federal ConstitutiopR
has the effect of overriding the power of the State to establish
:ll regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health,
safety, or general -welfare of the community; that this power
can neither be abdicated or bargained away, and is inalienable
even by express grant; and that all contract and property
rights are held subject to its fair exercise. (Atlantic Coast
Line v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548-562, and cases cited.) And
it is also settled that the police power embraces regulations
lesigned to promote the public convenience or the general
velfare and prosperity as well as those in the interest of the
public health, morals or safety. (Lake Shore & Mich. South-
ern Ry. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 292; C. B. & Q. Ry. v. Drainage
Commissioners, 200 U. S. 561, 592; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.
S. 311, 317.)'
"The italics in the above quotation are ours. It 'was
under similar definitions of 'Police Power' that this court
held that the fixing of reasonable rates for public service is
the exercise of the sovereign police power of the State. Such
power cannot be contracted away, nor can the Legislature of
the State authorize a municipal corporation to contract away
this police power of the State. It is clear that the Legislature
cannot confer more power upon one of its creatures (a muni-
cipal corporation) than it possesses itself. The Legislature
is prohibited by the Constitution from abridging the police
power of the State, and it cannot legally authorize any crea-
ture of the Legislature to abridge this sovereign power. So
that we care not what the literal meaning of Section 9239,
Revised Statutes 1909, may be. If it be construed so as to
abridge or limit the exercise of the sovereign police power of
the State, the Legislature overstepped constitutional limi-
tations in enacting it. If it be construed as simply authoriz-
ing a contract until such time as the State saw fit to assert
its police power, as it did in the Public Service Commission
239
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Act, then it would be at least harmless in the instant case.
It is, however, clear that under our Section 5 of Article 1Z
of the Constitution of 1875 (a section not theretofore found.
in our Constitution) the Legislature itself cannot abridge the
police power of the State. Nor can it authorize a municipal
corporation to make a contract abridging or limiting such
police power. So that if, as we have held, the fixing of rates
for public service is an exercise of the police power, then
under other rulings cited above the Public Service Commission
had a right to fix reasonable rates irrespective of the alleged
contract. The great weight of authority so holds."
To summarize the law in Missouri as construed by this
decision, which has since been consistently followed, certain
fundamental principles may be stated. First. The regulation
of rates is an exercise of the police power by the legislative
branch of the State. Second. That this power has been dele-
gated by the legislature to the Public Service Commission.
Third. That our Constitution prohibits the abridgment of the
police power by the legislature or a municipality. Fourth.
That the legislature cannot confer upon a municipality the
power to make a contract to fix rates that would be binding
either upon the municipality or upon the State.
While the Sedalia case does not so hold, it would seem
to follow as a corrollary to the last mentioned principle that
if the Public Service Commission had not been created, the
utilities, by resorting to the courts, could nevertheless have
increased their franchise rates over the protest and without
the consent of the cities where it could be shown that the
rates fixed by the franchise constituted a confiscation of their
property. This is at least what happened in some States
where the commissions were not given jurisdiction over cer.
tain local utilities, and where cities had not been expressly
authorized to contract concerning same. In the State of Iowa
the power to fix electric rates is not lodged in the Railroad
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Commission of that State. Their statute confers jurisdiction
upon the municipalities in about the same manner as the Mis-
souri statute provided prior to the creation of the Public
Service Commission. In the case of Southern Iowa Electric
Company v. Chariton, supra, the franchise of the company
fixed a maximum schedule of rates. By reason of the rise
in prices resulting from the World War, these rates became
unremunerative and the company, under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, brought
injunction suits in the Federal courts restraining the city
officials from enforcing these rates and from interfering with
the company in collecting higher ones. The case went to the
Supreme Court, Chief Justice White writing the opinion, in
which it was held that the city had no authority under the
statute to make a contract fixing permanent rates; that its
power to fix rates was a continuing power to fix reasonable
rates, and that when a rate became confiscatory by reason
of changed economic conditions it became the duty of the
city to fix new ones that would be remunerative, and upon
a failure or refusal to do so the utility could then fix its own
rates and the courts would restrain the city from interfering.
A similar situation would have existed in Missouri if the Pub-
lic Service Commission Act had not been enacted.
In s general way the foregoing sets forth the fundamental
principles of law which make it the duty of the Commission to
set aside franchise rates, when and where it clearly appears
that such rates have become either exorbitant or confiscatory
as the case may be. I use the phrase "duty of the Commis-
sion" advisedly, for that is exactly what the law casts upon
the Commission. So much so, that in the case of Missouri
Southern Railroad v. The Public Service Commission, 3 the
Supreme Court issued a mandamus directing the Commission
13. 259 Mo. 704.
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to investigate and fix railroad rates regardless of 'the fact
that the legislature had fixed them by statute. I use the phrase
"duty of the Commission" for another 'reason: it certainly
has never afforded the Commissioners any personal pleasure
to set aside franchise rates; but on the cpntrary such action
has always been an unpleasant task and the Commission has
sought ways and means, where possible, to avoid doing so;
however, where the duty clearly appeared, the Commission
has not willfully shirked its responsibility in the matter.
I have discussed some of the legal principles involved in
franchise rate cases. In addition, it may be said that rules
of law do not stand alone, separate and apart from all other
rules and motives that guide our daily actions. Correct rules
of law are based upon and supported by moral and economic
principles. The query naturally arises, since the regulatory
power is exercised to promote the public convenience and
prosperity and the general welfare, in what manner are these
promoted by the setting aside of contract rates 7 The answer,
of course, is apparexit when the setting aside is to result in a
lowering of the rate. The advocates of the people were able
to convince the courts that if the consumer had no recourse
through the police power to change franchise rates then he
was at the mercy of the corporation in cases where, through
fraud or political manipulation, unfair or unjust rates had
been fixed for a long period of time, or where, through science
and invention or falling prices, the cost of rendering the serv-
ice had been materially reduced so that the rates fixed became
unreasonable and exorbitant. The public readily understood
the foregoing argument in favor of subjecting franchise rates
to regulation under the police power.
On the other hand, it is more difficult to convince a con-
sumer that increasing franchise rates in any way promotes
the public convenience, prosperity or the general welfare.
This, however, in a measure at least, is true, and for this
reason: the service is necessary, likewise the quality and the
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continuity of the service is necessary. It requires capital to
render the service and unless the business is remunerative
or has a good prospect to be remunerative, capital will avoid
the business, so as to make it impossible for the company to
inake extensions and improvements required by the com-
munity served. Further, if economic conditions have so radi-
cally changed that the rate fixed by a franchise has become
confiscatory and there appears no immediate relief therefrom
except by an increase, then the company on failure to receive
an increase will either go into receivership, cease operation,
or reduce the quality of the service so as to continue to operate
under the rates. A receivership would result in added ex-
pense to be paid out of rates; cessation of operation would
entail untold loss to a community, and a reduction in the
quality ol service could only redound to the detriment of
the consumer. Where an increase in rates is necessary to
attract capital to make extensions and improvements or to
protect the continuity or quality of the service, the granting
of such an increase may reasonably be said to piomote the
general welfare.
But aside from these reasons, it would seem that if the
State is to exercise the police power to decrease established
rates when they have become unreasonably high, then, in
equity, the State should likewise exercise the same power
when the rate, on account of changed conditions, has become
confiscatory. So it would seem that the rules of law casting
the duty upon the Public Service Commission to increase or
to decrease so-called contract rates as the exigencies of the
times may demand are founded upon sound moral and eco-
nomic principles.
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